circumftances, it has happened a certain number of times, and failed a certain other number of times. H e adds, that he foon perceived that it would not be very difficult to do this, provided fome rule could be found according to which we ought to effimate the chance that the probability for the happening of an event perfectly unknown, ffiould lie between any two named degrees of probability, antecedently to any ex periments made about i t ; and that it appeared to him that the rule m ud be to fuppofe the chance the fame that it ffiould lie between any two equidifferent de grees ; which, if it were allowed, all the reft might be ealily calculated in the common method of pro ceeding in the dodtrine of chances. Accordingly, I find among his papers a very ingenious folution of this problem in this way. But he afterwards confidered, that the populate on which he had argued might not perhaps be looked upon by all as reafonable; and therefore he chofe to lay down in another form the propofition in which he thought the folution of the problem is contained, and in a jcholium to fubjoin the reafons why he thought fo, rather than to take into his mathematical reafoning any thing that might ad mit difpute. This, you will obferve, is the method which he has purfued in this effay.
Every judicious perfon will be fenfible that the problem now mentioned is by no means merely a curious fpeculation in the dodtrine of chances, but neceffary to be folved in order to a fure foundation for all our reafonings concerning pad: fadts, and what is likely to be hereafter. Common fenfe is indeed fufficient to ffiew us that, from the obfervation of what has in former indances been the confequence of a certain 5 caufe
caufe or action, one may make a judgment what is likely to be the confequence of it another time, and that the larger number of experiments we have to fupport a conciufion, fo much the more reafon we have to take it for granted. But it is certain that we cannot determine, at leal! not to any nicety,' in what degree repeated experiments confirm a conciufion, without the particular difcuffion of the beforementioned problem ; which, therefore, is neceflary to be confidered by any one who would give a clear account of the flrength of analogical or ; con cerning, which at prefent, we feem to know little more than that it does fometimes in fadt convince us, and at other times n o t; and that, as it is the means of cquainting us with many truths, of which otherwife we mull have been ignorant; fo it is, in all proba bility, the fource of many errors, which perhaps might in lome meafure be avoided, if the force that this fort of reafoning ought to have with us were more diftindtly and clearly underftood.
Thefe obfervations prove that the problem enquired after in this eflay is no lefs important than it is curi ous. It may be fafely added, I fancy, that it is alfo a problem that has never before been folved. Mr. D e Moivre, indeed, the great improver of this part of mathematics, has in his Laws of chance *, after Ber noulli, and to a greater degree of exadtnefs, given rules to find the probability there is, that if a very great number of trials be made concerning any event, the proportion of the number of times it will hap pen, to the number of times it will fail in thofe tri als, fhould differ lefs than by fmall afligned limits from the proportion of the probability of its happen ing to the probability of its failing in one tingle trial. But I know of no perfon who has fhewn how to de duce the folution of the converfe problem to th is; namely, " the number of times an unknown event <c has happened and failed being given, to find the " chance that the probability of its happening thould " lie fomewhere between any two named degrees of " probability." W hat Mr. De Moivre has done therefore cannot be thought fufficient to make the confederation of this point unnecefiary : efpecially, as the rules he has given are not pretended to be rigoroufly exadt, except on fuppofition that the number of trials made are infinite ; from whence it is not ob vious how large the number of trials muft be in or der to make them exadt enough to be depended on in pradtice.
M r. De Moivre calls the problem he has thus folved, the hardeff that can be propofed on the fubjedt of chance. His folution he has applied to a very important purpofe, and thereby fhewn that thofe a remuch miftaken who have inlinuated that the Doc trine of Chances in mathematics is of trivial confequcnce, and cannot have a place in any ferious enqui ry *. The purpofe I mean is, to fhew what reafon we have for believing that there are in the conftitution of things fixt laws according to which events happen, and that, therefore, the frame of the world muff be the effedfc of the wifdom and power of an intelligent caufe; and thus to confirm the argument taken from final caufes for the exigence of the Deity. It will be eafy to fee that the converfe problem foived in this effay is more diredtly applicable to this purpofe; for it fhews us, with diltindtnefs and precision, in every cafe of any particular order or recurrency of events, what reafon there is to think that fuch recurrency or order is derived from liable caufes or regulations inna ture, and not from any of the irregularities of chance.
T he two lafl rules in this effay are given without the deductions of them. I have chofen to do this becaufe thefe deductions, taking up a good deal of room, would fwell the effay too much ; and alfo be caufe thefe rules, though of confiderable ufe, do not anfwer the purpofe for which they are given as per fectly as could be wiflied.
They are however ready to be produced, if a communication of them fhould be thought proper. I have in fome places writ fhort notes, and to the whole I have added an application of the rules in the effay to fome particu lar cafes, in order to convey a clearer idea of the na ture of the problem, and to fhew how far the foiution of it has been carried. 1 am fenfible that your time is fo much taken up that I cannot reafonably expedt that you fhouid mi nutely examine every part of what I now fend you. Some of the calculations, particularly in the Appen dix, no one can make without a good deal of labour. I have taken fo much care about them, that I believe there can be no material error in any of them ; but Ihould there be any fuch errors, I am the only perfon who ought to be confidered as anfwerable for them.
[ 375 ] M r. Bayes has thought fit to begin his work with a brief demonftration of the general laws of chance. His reafon for doing this, as he fays in his introduc tion, was not merely that his reader might not have the trouble of fearching elfewhere for the principles on which he has argued, but becaufe he did not know whither to refer him for a clear demonftration of them. H e has alfo made an apology for the peculiar definition he has given of the word chance or proba bility. His defign herein was to cut off all difpute about the meaning of the word, which in common language is ufed in different fenfes by perfons of dif ferent opinions, and according as it is applied to pafi ox future fadts. But whatever different fenfes it may have, all (he obferves) will allow that an expedtation depending on the truth of any pajl fadl, or the hap pening of any future event, ought to be eftimated fo much the more valuable as the fadt is more likely to be true, or the event more likely to happen. Inftead therefore, of the proper fenfe of the word lity, he has given that which all will allow to be its proper meafure in every cafe where the word is ufed. But it is time to conclude this letter. Experimental philofophy is indebted to you for feveral difcoveries and improvements 5 and, therefore, I cannot help thinking that there is a peculiar propriety in diredting to you the following efiay and appendix. T hat your enquiries may be rewarded with many further fuccefles, and that you may enjoy every every valuable blefiing, is the fincere wifh of, Sir, your very humble fervant, Newington* Green, N ov. io , 1763.
Richard Price.
C c c ' s SEC-
Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance that the probability of its happening in a Angle trial lies fomewhere between any two degrees of pro bability that can be named.
S E C T I O N I . 2. T w o events are contrary when one, or other of them muft ; and both together cannot happen.
3. An event is faid to J a i l, when it cann pen ; or, which comes to the fame thing, when its con trary has happened.
4. An event is faid to be determined when it has cither happened or failed.
5. T he probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon it's happening.
6. By chance I mean the lame as probability.
7. Events are independent when the happening of any one of them does neither increase nor abate the probability of the reft.
PROP.
1.
W hen feveral events are inconliftent the probabili ty of the happening of one or other of them is the lum of the probabilities of each of them. Suppofe
Suppofe there be three fuch events, and which ever of them happens I am to receive N , and that the pro bability of the ift, 2d, and 3d are refpeCtively b c -> Then (by the definition of probability) the va lue of my expectation from the ift will be , from the 2d by and from the 3d cW herefore of my expectations from all three will be qBut the fum of my expectations from all three is in this cafe an expectation of receiving N upon the hap pening of one or other of them. Wherefore (by de finition 5) the probability of one or other of them is or ^ -f A -f i -. T he fum of the probabilities of each of them.
Corollary. I f it be certain that one or other of the three events muft happen, then a b c
For in this cafe all the expectations to gether amounting to a certain expectation of re ceiving N, their values together muft be equal to N. And from hence it is plain that the proba bility of an event added to the probability of its fai lure (or of its contrary) is the ratio of equality. For thefe are two inconfiftent events, one of which neceftarily happens. Wherefore if the probability of p . . ft_p an event is -that ot it's failure will be -JN N PROP. 2. If a perfon has an expectation depending on the happening of an event, the probability of the event is to the probability of its failure as his lefs if it fails to his gain if it happens.
Suppofe a perfon has an expectation of receiving N, depending on an event the probability of which is
Then (by definition £) the value of his ex-
IN
pedtation is P, and therefore if the event fail, he lofes that which in value is P ; and if it happens he re ceives N, but his expectation ceafes. His gain there fore is N*-P. L'ikewife fince the probability of the P event is -, that of its failure (by corollary prop, i) . N-P N0 P .
M-P T> . AT r, . isb u t -is to --as P is to JN-P, 1. e.
N' IN N the probability of the event is to the probability of it's failure, as his lofs if it fails to his gain if it happens.
PROP. 3. T he probability that two fubfequent events will both happen is a ratio compounded of the probabi lity of the iff, and the probability of the 2d on fuppofition the iff happens.
Suppofe that, if both events happen, I am to receive P N , that the probability both will happen is , that the 1 ft will is ^ (and confequently that the ift will not is ) and that the 2d will happen upon fuppofition the ift does is T hen (by definition 5) P will be the value of my expectation, which will be come b if the ift happens. Confequently if the ift happens, my gain by it is b-P, and if it fails my lofs is P. Wherefore, by the foregoing propofition, is to N_a # -rr=~, i. e. a is to N -a as P is to b-P. W herefore (componendo inverfe) is to N as P is to . But the ratio of P to N is compounded of the ratio of P to by and that of b to N. Wherefore the 5 fame [ 379 ] fame ratio of P to N is compounded of the ratio of a to N and that of b to*N, i. e. the probability that the two fubfequent events will both happen is com pounded of the probability of the i ft and the proba bility of the 2d on fuppolition the i ft happens. Corollary. Hence if of two fubfequent events the probability of the ift be and the probability of both together be -, then the probability of the 2d
. P on fuppofition the ift happens is PROP. 4.
I f there be two fubfequent events to be determined every day, and each day the probability of the 2d is l . P and the probability of both -, and I am to re ceive N if both the events happen the id: day on which the 2d does I fay, according to thefe conditions, the probability of my obtaining N is ~. For if not, let the probability of my obtaining N be â nd let yb e to xa s N -b to N . T hen fince -is the probability of my obtaining N (by definition 1) is the value of my expectation. And again, becaufe ac cording to the foregoing conditions the 1 ft day I have an expectation of obtaining N depending on the hap pening of both the events together, the probability of P which is -, the value of this expectation is P. Likewife, if this coincident fhould not happen I have an expectation of being reinftated in my former circumftances, i. e. of receiving that which in value is .*• de pending
pending on the failure of the 2d event the probability of which (by cor. Wherefore x is to P as N is to , and -(the P N probability of my obtaining N) is --Cor. Suppofe after the expectation given me in the foregoing proportion, and before it is at all known whether the ift event has happened or not, I fhould find that the 2d event has happened 5 from hence I can only infer that the event is determined on which my expectation depended, and have no reafon to efteem the value of my expectation either greater or lefs than it was before. For if I have reafon to think it lefs, it would be reafonable for me to give fomething to be reinfiated in my former circumftances, and this over and over again as often as I fhould be in formed that the 2d event had happened, which is evi dently abfurd, And the like abfurdity plainly follows if you fay I ought to fet a greater value on my expec tation than before, for then it would be reafonable for me to refufe lomething if offered me upon condition I would relinquifh it, and be reinftated in my former circumftances ; and this like wife over and over again as often as ( nothing being known concerning the jft event) it fhould appear that the 2d had happened. Notwithftanding therefore this difeovery that the 2d event / C 3 8 1 ] event has happened, my expectation ought to be efteemed the fame in value as before, i. e. x y and confequently the probability of my obtaining N is (by definition 5) flill ^ or But after this difcovery the probability of my obtaining N is the pro bability that the ifl: of two fubfequent events has hap pened upon thefuppofition that the 2d has, whofe pro babilities were as before fpecified. But the probability that an event has happened is the fame as the proba bility I have to guefs right if I guefs it has happened. Wherefore the following propofition is evident.
P R O P .
5.
If there be two fubfequent events, the probability b P of the 2d and the probability of both togetherand it being ifi: difcovered that the 2d event has hap pened, from hence I guefs that the iff event has alfo happened, the probability I am in the right is PROP.
* W hat is here faid may perhaps be a little illuftrated by confidering that all that can be loft by the happening of the 2d event is the chance I fhould have had of being reinftated in my former circumftances, if the event on which my expe<ftation depended had been determined in the manner expreffed in the proportion. But this chance is always as much ag me as it is f 1 ft event happens, it is againji me, and equal to the chance for the 2d event's failing. If the ift event does not happen, it is fo r me, and equal alfo to the chance for the 2d event's failing. T he lofs of it, therefore, can be no difadvantage.
. f W hat is proved by Mr. Bayes in this and the preceding pro pofition is the fame with the anfwer to the following queftion. W hat is the probability that a certain event, when it happens, will V ol. LIXI.
T he probability that feveral independent events fhall all happen is a ratio compounded of the proba bilities of each.
For from the nature of independent events, the probability that any one happens is not altered by the happening or failing of any of the reft, and confequently the probability that the 2d event happens on luppofttion the ift does is the fame with its original probability; but the probability that any two events happen is a ratio compounded of the probability of the 1 ft event, and the probability of the 2d on fuppofttion the 1 ft happens by prop. 3. Wherefore the probability that any two independent events both happen is a ra tio compounded of the probability of the ift and the probability of the 2d. And in like manner conftdering the ift and 2d event together as one event; the proba bility that three independent events all happen is a ratio compounded of the probability that the two ift both happen and the probability of the 3d. And thus you be accompanied with another to be determined at the fame time ? In this cafe, as one of the events is given, nothing can be due for the expectation of i t ; and, confequently, the value of an ex pectation depending on the happening of both events muft be the fame with the value of an expectation depending on the happen ing of one of them. In other words 5 the probability that, when one of two events happens, the other will, is the fame with the probability of this other. Call x then the probability of this b P other, and if -be the probability of the given event, andthe probability of both, becaufe X zz = the pro bability mentioned in thefe proportions.
may proceed if there be ever fo many fuch events* from whence the proposition is manifeft. Cor. i . I f there be Several independent events, the probability that the ift happens the 2d fails, the 3d fails and the 4th happens, &c. is a ratio compound--ed of the probability of the ift, and the probability of the failure of the 2d, and the probability of the failure of the 3d, and the probability of the 4th, &c. For the failure of an event may always be confidered as the happening of its contrary.
Cor. 2. If there be Several independent events, and the probability of each one be , and that of its fail ing be by the probability that the ift happens and the 2d fails, and the 3d fails and the 4th happens, &c. will be a b b a, &c. For, according to the algebraic way o f notation, if a denote any ratio and b another, abba denotes the ratio compounded of the ratios a^ b y b y a . This corollary therefore is only a particular cafe of the foregoing. Definition. I f in confequence of certain data there arifes a probability that a certain event Should happen, its happening or failing, in confequence of thefe data, I call it's happening or failing in the 1 ft trial. And if the fame data be again re repeated, the happening or failing of the event in confequence of them I call its happening or failing in the 2d trial 5 and fo on as often as the fame data are repeated. And hence it is manifeft that the hap pening or failing of the fame event in fo many diftetrials, is in reality the happening or failing of lo many diftindt independent events exadtly Similar to each other.
Ddd 2 PROP,
I f the probability of an event be and that of its failure be b in each Angle trial, the probability of its happening p times, and failing y times i n / f f y t r i a l s is E ar b1 if E be the coefficient of the term in which occurs a* U when the binomial b\t ^ 9 is ex panded.
For the happening or failing of an event in differ ent trials are fo many independent events. W here fore (by cor. 2. prop. 6.) the probability that the event happens the iff trial, fails the 2d and 3d, and hap pens the 4th, fails the 5th, &c. (thus happening and failing till the number of times it happens be p and the number it fails be q )i s &c. til number of as b q p and the number of b's is; 'tis d b\ In like manner if you confider the event as happening p times and failing q times in any other particular order, the probability for it is aT ; but the number of different orders according to which an event may happen or fail, fo as in all to happen p times and fail y, m p q trials is equal to the num ber of permutations that aaaa bbb admit of when the number of as isp y and the number of U s is y.
And this number is equal to E, the coefficient of the term in which occurs cf b q when a -J-b\ panded. T he event therefore may happen p times and fail y in p -\-q trials E different ways and no more, and its happening and failing thefe feveral dif ferent ways are fo many inconfiftent events, the pro bability for each of which is a* bq> and therefore by prop.
prop. 1. the probability that fome way or other it happens p times and fails times in -j-trials is E a* bK
Populate. 1. I Suppofe the fquare table or plane ABCD to be fo made and levelled, that if either of the balls 0o r W be thrown upon it, there fha be the fame probability that it refts upon any one equal part of the plane as another, and that it m ud neceflarily reft fomewhere upon it.
2. I fuppofe that the ball W fhall be ift thrown, and through the point where it refts a line fhall be drawn parallel to A D, and meeting C D and A B in 
commenfurable to each other, they may each be di vided into the fame equal parts, which being done, and the ball W thrown, the probability it will reft fomewhere upon any number of thefe equal parts will be the furn of the probabilities it has to reft upon each one of them, becaufe its refting upon any differ ent parts of the plane A C are fo many inconfiftent events; and this fum, becaufe the probability it fhould reft upon any one equal part as another is the fame, is the probability it fhould reft upon any one equal part multiplied by the number of parts. Confequently, the probability there is that the ball W fhould reft fome where upon Y bi s the probability it has to reft upon one equal part multiplied by the number of equal parts in and the probability it refts fomewhere upon Cf or LA , he. that it dont reft upon F b (becaufe it muft reft fome where upon A C) is the probability it refts upon one equal part multiplied by the number of equal parts in C / , L A taken together. W herefore, the probability it refts upon F bi s to the probability it dont as the number o f equal parts in F b is to the number of equal parts in C f L A together, or as F to C L A together, or as f b to B A b together. W here fore the probability it reft upon F is to the proba bility it dont as f b to B f ponendo i n v e r f e ) the probability it refts upon F is to the probability it refts upon F b added to the proba bility it dont, as J b to A B, or as the ratio o f to A B to the ratio of A B to A B. But the probabi lity of any event added to the probabiiity of its failure is the ratio of equality; wherefore, the probability it reft upon F b is to the ratio of equality as the ratio of j b to A B to the ratio of A B to A B, or the ratio of equality 5 and therefore the probability it reft upon , the reft will gradually decreafe as they are farther and farther from it on each fide, as appears from the conftrudtion of the figure, and confequently eh is greater than g f or any other ordinate that in fills upon ef. And if A 0w ere equal to A f, or were any mean be tween A e and A f\ the laft mentioned probability for the fame reafons would be the ratio of or fome other of the ordinates infilling upon ej\ to AB. But e his the greateft of all the ordinates that infift upon e f Wherefore, upon luppofttion the point fhould lie
E e e anv
[ 389 ]
[ 3 9° ] any where between f and e> the probability that the event M happens pt imes and fails in p \ q als can't be greater than the ratio of to A B. There then being thefe two fubfequent events, the i ft that the point o will lie between e and / , the 2d that the event M will happen p times and tail q in p-f-q trials, and the probability of the ift (by lemma lft) is the ratio o f e j to A B , and upon fuppofition the ift happens, by what has been now proved, the probability of the 2d cannot be greater than the ratio of eh to A B, it evidently follows (fro Prop. 3.) that the probability both together will hap pen cannot be greater than the ratio compounded of that of e ft o A B and that of to A B , which compound ratio is the ratio of f h to C A. W here fore, the probability that the point 0 will lie between f and e> and the event M happen p times and fail y, is not greater than the ratio of to C A. And in like, manner the probability the point 0 will lie be tween e and d, and the event M happen and fail before, cannot be greater than the ratio of to C A.
And again, the probability the point 0 will lie between d and c, and the event M happen and fail as before, cannot be greater than the ratio o f to C A. And laftly, the probability that the point 0 will lie between c and and the event M happen and fail as before, cannot be greater than the ratio of b k to C A . Add now all thefe feveral probabilities together, and their fum (by Prop. 1.) will be the probability that the point will lie fomewhere between f and by and the event M happen p times and fail q trials. Add likewife the correfpondent ratios together, and their fum will be the ratio of the funi of the antecedents to [ 3 9 i ] to their common confequent, i. e. the ratio of f h \ ei, ci, bk together to C A ; which ratio is lefs than that of D to C A, becaufe D is greater than f h , ei, c i , bk together. And therefore, t probability that the point o will lie betw een/' and and withal that the event M will happen p times and fail q in p-fqt rials, is D to C A ; but it was fuppofed the fame which is abfurd. And in like manner, by infcribing rectangles within the figure, as eg,
cm, yo that the laft mentioned probability is greater than the ratio of any figure lefs than fghikmb to C A .
Wherefore, that probability mull be the ratio of fghikmb to C A .
Cor. Before the ball W is thrown the probability that the point o will lie fomewhere between A and B, or fomewhere upon the line A B, and withal that the event M will happen p times, and fail q in p -ftrials is the ratio of the whole figure A / B to C A.
But it is certain that the point o will lie fomewhere upon A B. Wherefore, before the ball W is thrown the probability the event M will happen p times and fail q in p q trials is the ratio of A /B to C A.
PROP. 9.
I f before any thing is difcovered concerning the place of the point 0, it fhould appear that the event M had happened p times and failed q in *p -]-q trials, and from hence I guefs that the point 0 lies between any two points in the line A B, as f and b, and confequently that the probability of the event M in a tin gle trial was fomewh^re between the ratio of A to A B and that of A / f o A B : the probability I am in
the right is the ratio of that part of the figure A z B defcribed as before which is intercepted between perpendiculars erected upon A B at the points and b y to the whole figure A z B.
For, there being thefe two fubfequent events, the firfi: that the point o will lie between f and b; the fecond that the event M fhould happen times and fail qi n p qt rials; and (by cor. prop. 8.) the original probability o f the fecond is the ratio of A z B to C A, and (by prop. 8.) the probability o f both is the ratio o f f g h im to C A ; w (by prop. 5) it being firfi: difcovered that the fecond has happened, and from hence I guefs that the firft has happened alfo, the probability I am in the right is the ratio o f fghim b to A/B, the point w hich was to be proved.
Cor. The fame things fuppofed, if I guefs that the probability o f the event M lies fomewhere be tween 0 and the ratio o f A to A B, my chance to be in the right is the ratio o f A to A i B-

Sch o l iu m .
From the preceding propofition it is plain, that in the cafe of fuch an event as I there call M , from the number o f times it happens and fails in a cer tain number of trials, without knowing any thing more concerning it, one may give a guefs where abouts it's probability is, and, by the ufual methods computing the magnitudes o f the areas there menti oned, fee the chance that the guefs is right. And that the fame rule is the proper one to be ufed in the cafe of an event concerning the probability o f which we we abfolutely know nothing antecedently to any trials made concerning it, feems to appear from the following confideration; viz. that concerning fuch an event I have no reafon to think that, in a certain num ber o f trials, it fhould rather happen any one pofiible number of times than another. For, on this account, I may juftly reafon concerning it as if its probability had been at fir ft unfixed, and then determined in fuch a manner as to give me no reafon to think that, in a certain num ber o f trials, it fhould rather happen any one pofible num ber o f tfmes than another. But this is exactly the cafe o f the event M" For before the ball W is throw n, w hich determines it's probability in a fingle trial, (by cor. prop. 8.) the probability it has to happen times and fail qi n p-]~ q°r C A, w hich ratio is the fame when p q or is given, whatever number p is as will appear by com puting the magnitude of A / B by the m ethod * of fluxions. And confequently before the place of the point o is difcovered or the num ber of times the event M has happened in n trials, I can have no reafon to think it fhould rather happen one poffible number of times than another.
In what follows therefore I fhall take for granted that the rule given concerning the event M in prop. 9. is alfo the rule to be ufed in relation to any event concerning the probability o f which nothing * It will be proved prefently in art. 4. by computing in the method here mentioned that A iB contracted to 1 is to C A as 1 to « + 1 x E : from whence it plainly follows that, antecedently to this contraction, A * B muft be to C A in the ratio of 1 to n + 1, which is a conftant ratio when n is give whatever p is.
[ 393 ]
at all is known antecedently to any trials made or obferved concerning it. And fuch an event I fhall call an unknown event.
Cor. Hence, by fuppofing the ordinates in the fi gure A i B to be contracted in the ratio of E to one, which makes no alteration in the proportion of the parts of the figure intercepted between them, and applying what is faid of the event M to an unknown event, we have the following propofition, which gives the rules for finding the probability of an event from the number of times it actually happens and fails. P R O P. io .
I f a figure be deferibed upon any bafe A H (Vid. 
fc, t
F at right angles with it, the chance that the probability of the event lies fomewhere be tween the ratio of A ft o A H and that of At A H , is the ratio of t¥ C f that part of the beforedeferibed figure which is intercepted between the two ordinates, to A C F H the whole figure infilling on the bafe A H . This is evident from prop. 9. and the remarks made in the foregoing fcholium and corollary.
5 Now
[ 395 ]
Now, in order to reduce the forego ing rule to practice, we mull find the value of the area of the figure defcribed and the feveral parts of it feparated, by ordi nates perpendicu lar to its bale. 
y -1 X y-2 x x -J-&c. Now the abfcifTe being * , 3 p ^ % /,+ 1 x and the ordinate x the correfpondent area is x * which feries will confift of few terms and therefore is to be ufed when p is fmall. to ACFFI is « -J-j x E X ^ into the difference between [ 399 ] between the two feries, Compare this with prop, iq , and we (hail have the following pra&ical rule* If nothing is known concerning an event but that it has happened p times and failed in or n trials, and from hence I guefs that the probability of its happening in a Angle trial lies fomewhere between any two degrees of probability as X and the chance I am in the right in my guefs is -p i X E into the difference between the feries X^ + I p + 2 P + 3
The fame things fuppofed as before, the ratio of
-See. and the
being the coefficient of ap bq when * is expanded. This is the proper rule to be ufed when is a fmali number but if q is large and p fmall, change every where in the feries here fet down p into q and q into and x into r or i-x , and X into R -i -X ; which will not make any alteration in the difference between the two feriefes. Thus far M r. Bayes's effay.
W ith refpedt to the rule here given, it is further to be obferved, that when both p and q are very large numbers, it will not be poffible to apply it to practice on account of the multitude of terms which the fe riefes in it will contain. M r. Bayes, therefore, by
Fff 2 an an inveftfgation which it would be too tedious to give here, has deduced from this rule another* * which is as follows. bfiB is* 3
C 400 ] T h e third term in the two divifors, as I have given them, being omitted. Bat this being evidently owing to afmall overfight in the deduction of this rule, which I have reafon to think Mr. Bayes had himfelf difcovered, I have ventured to correct his copy, and to give the rule as 1 am fatisfied it ought to be given. cd enoting the circle whofe radius is unity. But Mr. Bayes, in a preceding pa^ per in this volume, has demonftrated that, though this expreilion will very nearly approach to the value of this fum when only a proper number of the iirft terms is taken, the whole feries cannot exprefs any quantity at all, becaufe, let x be what it will, there will be always a part of the feries where it will begin to diverge. T his obfervation, though it does not much afFe<5t the ufe of this feries, feems well worth the noticeof mathematicians. 462
in the values of D, E, F, S e c . are the 2, 3, 4, &c. higheft coeffici ents in a -\ -b |7, a -Jexpanded; affixing in every particular value the lead: of thefe coeffieents to B, the next in magnitude to the furtheft letter from B, the next to C, the next to the fur-theft but one, the next to D, the next to the furtheft but two, and fo on W ith refpeCt to the value of the feries --
x -
Sec. he has obferved that i calculated direCtly when m is lefs than not greater than V J : but when m z is much larger it becomes impracticable to do this; in which cafe he ffiews a way o f ealily finding two values of it very nearly equal between which it's true value muft lie.
The theorem he gives for this purpofe is as fol lows.
Let K, as before, ftand for the ratio of the quadrantal arc to its radius, and H for the ratio whofe . . -z , ) and yet the operatio carried on by the 2d rule* or mz not exceed vY* But in order to (hew diftin&ly and fully the nature of the prefent problem, and how far Mr. Bayes has carried the folution of it j I (hall give the refult of this folution in a few cafes, beginning with the loweft and moft fimple.
[ 4°5 ]
Let us then firft fuppofe, of fuch an event as that called M in the eflay, or an event about the proba bility of which, antecedently to trials, we know no thing, that it has happened once> and that it is en quired what conclufion we may draw from hence with refpedt to the probability of it's happening on a fecond trial.
T h e anfwer is that there would be an odds of three to one for fomewhat more than an even chance that it would happen on a fecond trial. ior which (hews the chance there is that the probability of an event that has happened once lies fomewhere between i and 4.; or (which is the fame) the odds that it is fomewhat more than an even chance that it will happen on a fecond trial *.
In the fame manner it will appear that if the event has happened twice, the odds now mentioned will be feven to one ; if thrice, fifteen to o n e; and in gene ral, if the event has happened p times, there will be an odds of 2* + 1 -1 to one, for more than an equal chance that it will happen on further trials.
Again, fuppofe all I know of an event to be that it has happened ten times without failing, and the enquiry to be what reafon we fliall have to think we are right if we guefs that the probability of it's hap pening in a fingle trial lies fomewhere between and or that the ratio of the caufes of it's happen ing to thofe of it's failure is fome ratio between that of fixteen to one and two to one. Ĥ e re /-f-i = n , X = 44 and x = z^.and X'
•--Ip 11 = .5013 &c. T h e anfwer therefore is, that we fliall have very nearly an equal chance for being right.
In this manner we may determine in any cafe what conclufion we ought to draw from a given number of experiments which are unoppofed by contrary experiments. Every one fees in general that there is reafon to exped an event with more or lefs confidence according to the greater or lefs number of times in which, under given circumftances, it has happened without failing; but we here fee exadly what this reafon is, on what principles it is founded, and how we ought to regulate our expeditions.
But it will be proper to dwell longer on this head.
Suppofe a folid or die of whofe number of fides and conftitution we know nothing; and that we are to judge of thefe from experiments made in throwing it.
In this cafe, it fhould be obferved, that it would be in the higheffc degree improbable that the folid fhould, in the firft trial, turn any one fide which could be afligned before h an d ; becaufe it would be known that fome fide it mufl turn, and that there was an in finity of other fides, or fides otherwife marked, which it was equally likely that it fhould turn. T he firft 4 throw the fide then thrown, without giving any reafon to think that it has it any one number of times rather than any other. It will appear, therefore, that after the firft throw and not before, we fhould be in the circumftances required by the conditions of the prefent problem, and that the whole effedt of this throw would be to bring us into thefe circumftances. T hat is: the turning the fide firft thrown in any fubfequent tingle trial would be an event about the probability or improba bility of which we could form no judgment, and of which wre fhould know no more than that it lay fomewhere between nothing and certainty. W ith the fecond trial then our calculations mult begin; and if in that trial the fuppofed folid turns again the fame fide, there will arife the probability of three to one that it has more of that fort of fides than of all others j or (which comes to the fame) that there is fomewhat in its conftitution difpofing it to turn that fide ofteneft: And this probability will increafe, in the manner already explained, with the number of times in which that fide has been thrown without failing. It fhould not, however, be imagined that any number of fuch experiments can give fufiicient reafon for thinking that it would never turn any other fide.
For, fuppofe it has turned the fame fide in every trial a million of times. In thefe circumfiances there would be an improbability that it had lefs than 1.400.000 more of thefe fides than all others; but there would alfo be an improbability that it had above 1.600.000 times more. T h e chance for the latter is exprelTedby 444-4-w t raifed to the miliioneth power fubftra£ted from unity, which is equal 10,4647 & c.and G g g 2 the C 4 0 8 ] the chance for the former is equal to 4 *.4444.° raifed to the fame power, or to .48955 which, being both lefs than an equal chance, proves what i have laid. But though it would be thus improbable that it had above 1.600.000 times more or than 1.400,000 times more of thefe lides than of all others, it by no means follows that we have any reafon for judging that the true proportion in this cafe lies fomewhere between that of 1.600,000 to one and 1.400,000 to one. For he that will take the pains to make the calcula tion will find that there is nearly the probability exprefled by .527, or but little more than an equal chance, that it lies fomewhere between that of 600.000 to one and three millions to one. It m ay( deferve to be added, that it is more probable that this proportion lies fomewhere between that o f 900,000 to 1 and 1.900,000 to 1 than between any other two proportions whofe antecedents are to one another as 900,000 to 1.900,000, and confequents unity. I have made thefe obfervations chiefly becaufe they are all ftri&ly applicable to the events and appear ances of nature. Antecedently to all experience, it would be improbable as infinite to one, that any par ticular event, before-hand imagined, fhould follow the application of any one natural object to another; becaufe there would be an equal chance for any one of an infinity o f other events. But if we had once feen any particular effe&s, as the burning of wood on putting it into fire, or the falling of a ftone on de taching it from all contiguous objedls, then the conclufions to be drawn from any number of fubfequent events o f the fame kind would be to be determined in the fame manner with the conclufions jufl: m en tioned relating to the confutation of the folid I have fuppofed [ 4 0 9 ] fuppofed. . ■ ■ ■ ■ ---In other words. T h e fir ft experi ment fuppofed to be ever made on any natural object would only inform us of one event that may follow a particular change in the circumftances of thofe obje&s $ but it would not fuggeft to us any ideas of uniformity in nature, or give us the leaft reafon to apprehend that it was, in that inftance or in any other, regular ra ther than irregular in its operations. But if the fame event has followed without interruption in any one or more fubfequent experiments, then fome degree of uniformity will be obferved ; reafbn will be given i to expert the fame fuccefs in further experiments, and the calculations directed by the folution of this pro blem may be made. One example here it will not be amifs to give. Let us imagine to ourfelves the cafe of a perfon juft t brought forth into this, world and left to collect from his observation of the order and courfe of events what powers and caufes take place in it. T h e Sun would, probably, be the firft object that would engage his atten--tion 5 but after lofing it the firft night he would be en tirely ignorant whether he Ihould ever fee it again. H e would therefore be in the condtion of a perfon making a • firft experiment about an event entirely unknown to him. But let him fee a fecond appearance or one ; return of the Sun, and an expectation would be raifed in him of a fecond return, and he might know that there was an odds of 3 to i forfome probability of this. This odds would increafe, as before reprefented, with the number of returns to which he was witnefs. But no finite number of returns would be fufticient to produce abfolute or phyfical certainty. For let it be fuppofed that he has feen it return at regular and ftated intervals a million of times. T he conclufions 5 this. >
this would warrant would be fuch as follow ■ There would be the odds of the millioneth power of 2, to one, that it was likely that it would return again at the end of the ufual interval. There would be the probability expreffed by .5352, that the odds for this was not greater than 1.600,000 to 1 ; And the pro bability expreffed by .5105, that it was not left than 1400,000 to 1.
It fhoiild be carefully remembered that thefe de ductions fuppofe a previous total ignorance of nature. After having obferved for fome time the courfe of events it would be found that the operations of nature are in general regular, and that the powers and laws which prevail in it are ftabie and parmanent. T h e conlideration o f this will caufe one or a few experi ments often to produce a much ftronger expectation of fuccefs in further experiments than would otherwife have been reafonable 5 juft as the frequent obfervation that things of a fort are difpofed together in any place would lead us to conclude, upon difcovering there any objeCt of a particular fort, that there are laid up with it many others of the fame fort. It is obvious that this, fo far from contradicting the foregoing de ductions, is only one particular cafe to which they are to be applied. W hat has been faid feems fuflicient to fhew us what conclulions to draw from uniform experience.
It demonftrates, particularly, that inftead of proving that events will always happen agreeably to it, there will be always reafon againft this conclulion. In other words, where the courfe of nature has been the moft conftant, we can have only reafon to reckon upon a recurrency of events proportioned to the degree of [ 4 * 1 ] this condancy; but we can have no reafonfor thin kingthat there are nocaufes in nature which will inrerfere with the operations of the caufesfrom which this condancy is derived, or no circumftances of the world in which it will fail. And if this is true, fuppofing our only data derived from experience, w find additional reafon for thinking thus if we ap ply other principles, or have recourfe to fuch eonfiderations as reafon, independently of experience, can fugged:. ' ' But I have gone further than I intended here $ and it is time to turn our thoughts to another branch of this fubjedt: I mean, to cafes where an experiment has fometimes fucceeded and fometimes failed.
Here, again, in order to be as plain and explicit as poffible, it will be proper to put the following cafe, which is the ealied and fimpled I can think of.
Let us then imagine a perfon prefent at the drawing of a lottery, who knows nothing of its fcheme or of the proportion of Blanks to Pr in it. Le be fuppofed, that he is obliged to infer this from the number of blanks he hears drawn compared with the number of p r i z e s; and that it is enquired what con clusions in thefe circumdances he may reafonably make.
Let him fird hear ten blanks drawn and one prize, and let it be enquired what chance he will have for being right if he guefles that the proportion of blanks to^ prizes in the lottery lies fomewhere between the pro portions of 9 to 1 and 11 to 1.
Here taking X -qi., x =:_%.,/> =rio, 1, n~~\ 1,
